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T
he nomination of Ben Bernanke to be Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board has rekindled a smoldering
debate in U.S. monetary policy circles—namely,
whether the Federal Reserve should join the ranks of the
world’s inflation targeting central banks. “Inflation targeting”
is a sometimes nebulous phrase used to describe a monetary
policy style which, at its heart, has the central bank setting an
explicit, long-run, numeric target for inflation. Beginning in the
1990s, several countries in the world, perhaps most promi-
nently the United Kingdom, formally began inflation targeting.
Bernanke is on the record favoring inflation targeting, while
outgoing Chairman Alan Greenspan has been opposed.
One particularly relevant summary of this debate occurred
at the conference “Inflation Targeting: Prospects and
Problems,” held at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
in October 2003.1 At that conference, Bernanke, then a Fed
Governor, participated in a panel discussion with Fed
Governor Donald Kohn and European Central Bank (ECB)
Executive Board member Otmar Issing. Governor Kohn, like
Chairman Greenspan, has generally been opposed to inflation
targeting. The ECB, the central bank most like the Fed in size
and influence, has wrestled with inflation targeting issues
since its inception in 1998. Thus, the panel provided an
opportunity to debate the pros and cons of inflation targeting.
What were the main arguments?
In his discussion, Bernanke stated that he felt there was
an optimal, long-run inflation rate (OLIR) “that achieves the
best average economic performance over time with respect
to both the inflation and output objectives” [p. 166]. There
would be no drawback, in Bernanke’s view, to announcing
an explicit target in the neighborhood of 2 percent, provided
the FOMC makes no particular commitment to a timetable
for reaching the OLIR. This last proviso would make sure
that there were “no unwanted constraints on short-run mon-
etary policy” [p. 167]. In suggesting a numerical target near
2 percent, Bernanke emphasized that very low levels of infla-
tion are generally preferred, but not so low that the FOMC
would face an unacceptably high risk of encountering the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, as has occurred
in Japan over the past decade.
The ECB experience is perhaps only cold comfort for the
United States. Issing stressed that euro-zone monetary policy
has been implemented only since 1999 and that many of the
issues surrounding the introduction of the euro are special.
Still, the ECB Governing Council did successfully introduce
the new currency after adopting price stability as a main
objective. The Council stated that it would strive to maintain a
euro-zone inflation rate “below but close to 2 percent over the
medium term” [p. 175]. Issing, like Bernanke, felt that 2 percent
was reasonable in part because “a sufficient safety margin
against the risk of deflation” [p. 175] was needed. Issing also
emphasized that inflation targeting approaches often call for
the central bank to adjust its nominal interest rate target in
response to an inflation forecast. He warned that actual fore-
casts may not summarize all factors important for price stabili-
ty; in addition, the forecasting model may be misspecified,
reflecting economists’uncertainty about the true nature of the
macroeconomy. Issing labeled these concerns “practical pit-
falls” of inflation targeting [p. 172].
Kohn argued that adoption of inflation targeting might
actually lead to worse economic performance relative to what
has been achieved in the past two decades, stating that “the U.S.
economy has benefited from the flexibility that the Federal
Reserve has derived by eschewing a formal inflation target”
[p. 180]. He questioned whether there was evidence that infla-
tion targeting countries have actually witnessed benefits relative
to non-inflation targeting countries. Like Issing, Kohn empha-
sized that there are many factors in actual policymaking that
inflation targeting approaches may be ill-suited to handle. He
concluded by stating that “those who propose changes from a
good system have a high burden of proof. The marginal benefits
[of changes] are not likely to be high [and may have] unintended
consequences” [p. 183].
The panel discussion makes it clear that Bernanke was think-
ing mostly in terms of the merits of setting an explicit, numerical
inflation target. He allowed the proviso that the Fed should make
no commitment about a timetable to return inflation to this
target, providing flexibility to policymakers to respond to special
factors that may be influencing the economy. Issing and Kohn
expressed little or only moderate concern with an explicit infla-
tion target, but had more serious reservations about unwittingly
placing constraints on policymakers, limiting their ability to
manage the risks that naturally arise day to day. Thus, the core
of the debate concerns whether adoption of inflation targeting
would place important short-run constraints on policymakers
and, if so, whether that is a good idea or not.
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1The conference proceedings, including the panel discussion, are published in
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2004, 86(4).
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